"We... got ourselves cleverly settled for the night... ..."
Soldiers' Shelter on Campaign During the War for Independence:
Tents in the Armies of the Revolution, Part II

John U. Rees
© 1997, 2002

Originally published in Military Collector & Historian,
vol. 49, no. 4 (Winter 1997), 156-168.

Read Part I

“Proceeded to the Falls of Schuylkill and at 11 A.M. reached the site of our former encampment, near Germantown, where we encamped and put up our tents, which we have been without for a week.”

Lt. James McMichael, Pennsylvania State Regiment,
Philadelphia Campaign, 13 September 1777.38

"The Allowance of Tents is not sufficient..."
An Overview of Tents as Shelter

Revolutionary Soldiers' lives revolved around the mess squad, comrades who cooked, ate, and slept together, the contingent assigned to one common tent forming a mess. The number of men allotted to each tent remained relatively static for British troops during the war. Lochee noted that one tent was to serve as shelter for five men and, with occasional exceptions, this was generally observed. From the 40th Regiment order book:39

R:O [19 June 1777] ... No more than 9 Mens Tents and 2 for the Offrs: Are to be Allowd: each Compy: Whatever more they have Must be Deliverd to the Qr:Mastr: with All spare Arms Accoutterments & Baggage in Order to be sent to N: York by the first Opportunity

The maximum strength of the companies in the regiment at the time was fifty men, allowing either five or six rank and file per tent.40

In the Continental Army one common tent usually accommodated six men. A June 1776 company return for Captain Joseph Bloomfield's Company, 3rd New Jersey Regiment, noted the number of "Tents to be Drawn for... 72 Soldiers, which is 12 Tents allowing Six men to a Tent." Two tents were allotted to the six officers present.41 The following spring regiments of the newly-raised Continental Army under George Washington were united in northern New Jersey. In May 1777 General William Woodford issued this directive to his Virginia Brigade:

The Quarter Master Genl. is to proportion the Tents to the Strength of Regts. One Tent to each five Privates 2 Tents to the Officers of each Company - one to each Field Officer—one to the Serjt. Major & Quarter Master Serjt. & one to each of the Staff any Regt. having drawn more than this proportion to deliver them to Col. Biddle Qr. Master General upon his application for the same No more than one Tent (Horsemans) to be allowed to each Regt.42

In this instance, with the exception of a single horseman's tent, common tents were used by both officers and privates. Until 1777 this was probably standard procedure in the American army. In summer of 1775, two years before Woodford's directive, the Virginia Convention had authorized the raising of "two regiments complete," allowing as part of their equipment a tent for every commissioned and staff officer, one tent for two sergeants or corporals, and "a proper and sufficient tent" for every six privates. Understandably, these early allotments were based on the British model, and, with occasional variations, remained the standard throughout the war. In August 1777 General John Sullivan required his Maryland division "to State the number of tents in their Respective Brigades, & Set forth the number wanting upon the following Calculations, Viz A tent to each Field officer, one to two Commissioned & Staff officers, one to 4 Serjts & one to 6 Privates including Corporals, as Well as Waggoners weomen &c"43 Two years later the allotment was even more detailed, with several kinds of tents mentioned for use. 27 May 1779, "The troops are to apply to the Quarter Master General without delay for tents in the following proportion for each regiment."44

One Markee and one Horseman's tent for the Field Officers.

One horseman's tent for the officers of each company.

One Wall'd tent for the Adjutant.

One      ditto      for the Quarter Master.

One      ditto      for the Surgeon and Mate

One      ditto      for the Pay-Master

One common tent for Serjeant Majr. and Qr. Mastr. Serjeant.

One        ditto        for the non commissioned officers of each company and one for every six privates including Drums and Fifes.

FIG 8. Illustration of a wall tent from Francis Grose's Military Antiquities, Respecting a History of the British Army. Four tents used during the war were similar: Horseman's tents had "walls ... from three to three & a half [to]... four feet high."; The wall tent was "a soldiers tent with walls from 2 1/2 to 3 feet high..."; A "half wall tent" was "a soldiers tent with low walls, say 18 or 20 Inches high."; and the "Noncommissioned Officers tent" was "the same as a soldiers, only with a 14 inch wall." Harold L. Peterson, The Book of the Continental Soldier (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1968), 154. Francis Grose, Military Antiquities, Respecting a History of the British Army (London, 1801), 2: 11, 28-40.

As the war progressed the official apportionment of common tents fluctuated. An "Estimate of Articles Necessary ... for 12 Months March 2d. 1779" was based upon "6000 Men to compleat 12 Regiments & 5 Men to a Tent." This document also stipulated that "the Officers of Eac. Co. will require one Horsemans Tent & one Com[mon]. d[itt]o." (Three officers per company according to the May 1778 regimental organization.) Each regiment's field officers (two or three in number) would need one marquee and horseman's tent, while the officers' waiters in a regiment would require a single common tent. Listed for the use of the "Hospital" were "6 Hospital Tents."45

FIG 9. An officer's marquee. Harold L. Peterson, The Book of the Continental Soldier (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1968), 154. Originally found in Francis Grose, Military Antiquities, Respecting a History of the British Army (London, 1801), 11, 28-40.

A 1782 "Estimate of Camp Equipage intended for a Regiment of Infantry" (31 January) included this allotment:46

1782 Estimate of Camp Equipage for a Regiment of Infantry

  Marquees Horseman's

3 Field Officers
2 Field Officers
to a Regt.


or 2    


Commissioned Officers of
each company

Surgeon & Mate   1    

Paymaster & Adjutant   1    

Quarter Master
& Q.M. Sergeant

Sergeant Major       1

Sergeants of
each Company

Drum & fife Majors       1 small

Drums & fifes and
rank & file
      1 to every
six men

Later in 1782 Colonel Walter Stewart noted an alteration to this scheme: "The Allowance of Tents is not sufficient for the Troops since that valuable system took Place of doing Duty by Corps. This brings all of the Men of the Regt together at once, and a Tent will not contain 7 Men with their Arms Accoutts. Knapsacks &c. The Surgeons complain likewise of the want of hospital Tents, this want occations the Sick and healthy Soldiers to be continuously together." Prior to this time the accepted method of taking soldiers for special duty (usually guard details) was to draft a certain number out of each regiment; the alternative was "doing Duty by Corps," meaning that the entire regiment was taken for such duty. The former method often meant that those on special duty did not have tents, while at least some soldiers remaining with the regiment enjoyed more tent room because of a comrade's absence.47

Apportioning the army's tentage in this manner was useful only as long as the miltary situation remained stable or the troops were relatively inactive. When the need for more mobility became necessary, or equipment was damaged or lost, the number of tents was reduced. Early in the war a lack of supplies limited options available to the commander in chief and engendered hardships for the soldiers. Washington wrote in July 1775, "We labour under great Disadvantages for want of Tents, for tho' they have been help'd by a collection of Sails from the Seaport Towns, the Number is yet far short of our Necessities. The Colleges and Houses of this Town [Cambridge, Massachusetts] are necessarily occupied by the Troops, which affords another reason for keeping our present Station... I most sincerely wish the whole Army was properly provided to take the Field, as I am well assured, that besides greater Expedition and activity in case of alarm, it would highly conduce to health and discipline." During the evacuation of Long Island and the occupation of New York City in 1776, British troops captured large quantities of equipment. In September of that year Washington directed that, "As many of the Regiments that came last from New York have lost their Tents and cooking Utensils... by which means one part of the Army are greatly distressed, whilst the other part are comfortably supplied; the General earnestly advises and directs the... commanding Officers of such Corps as have not suffered, to store their men thicker in their tents, and lend all they can spare, to their suffering fellow-soldiers, 'till such time as others can be provided."48

Supply problems continued to haunt the Continental Army throughout the war. In spring 1778 General Robert Howe led an expedition against British-held East Florida. From "Camp at Fort Howe on Alatamaha" River, Georgia, an American officer complained to William Moultrie, "I cannot help lamenting to you... that you have been much too parsimonious in your fitting us out for this expedition. What can be more cruel than crowding eight, ten, and twelve into one tent, or oblige those who cannot get in, to sleep in the heavy dews? what is more inconvenient than to have only one camp-kettle to ten, twelve or fifteen men? and in this hot climate to have one small canteen to six or eight men? we think no expense too great to procure men, but we do not think after we have got them, that we ought to go to the expense of preserving their health... the Gen. requested me to desire you to send round in a boat... 500 canteens, 100 camp-kettles, and 35 or 40 tents, I am sure they cannot be better employed, even if the state should lose them all."49

An accounting made at Valley Forge in June 1778 showed that numbers of tents held by individual regiments varied greatly in Washington's army. Total rank and file returned was 16,561 with 2,366 common tents, giving a ratio of seven rank and file per tent, the norm for the final years of the war. Unfortunately this reckoning does not take into account numbers of common tents needed to accommodate commissioned officers and staff (370 officers needing 185 tents at two men per tent) and noncommissioned officers (602 NCOs needing 150 tents at four men per tent). Allowing for those personnel leaves 2,031 tents to house 16,561 corporals, musicians and privates, at slightly over eight soldiers per tent, a not unheard of allotment. While this ratio may be barely workable, it still must be taken into account that the tents were not evenly distributed; some units had a sufficiency or oversupply, while others were chronically deficient as regards shelter. Finally, there remained 123 field officers in the various regiments who needed tents. The Valley Forge return included thirty-two marquees and thirty-nine horseman's tents, each of which probably housed two or three field officers (the majority of the regiments had only one or two field officers present). Allowing two per tent would account for 142 of these officers. Unfortunately many regiments had neither marquees nor horseman's tents, indicating that all of their officers would have had to use common tents, leaving fewer such tents to house the rank and file. All in all a confusing situation made worse by the impending start of the year's campaign.50

Any shortages were aggravated by problems with maintenance of tentage. In November 1778, James Abeel noted the possibility of the army moving into New Jersey, and suggested that Quartermaster General Nathanael Greene "give orders to have the Tents well dryed [and sent] to this Place [Morristown] to be repaired;" Abeel went on to state that "the great [wastage] last Campaign [i.e., 1777] was owing to their being wet in the Waggons." A critique of Friedrich Wilhelm de Steuben's new manual of discipline (later known as the "Blue Book") noted, "The Plan of Encampment is a very convenient One but it is necessary that the Tents should be all of one size — If some of them are larger than usual as has been the case with us the Intervals between the Tents are filled up and the Men in attempting to pass through tear and distroy them exceedingly — a great Number of Tents were, last Campaign [1778], from this very Circumstance rendered entirely Useless." Deputy Quartermaster General Jacob Weiss in February 1779 found, "the Tents in general delivered into Store to be much worse for Wear, and that there will be a Considerable Number wanted (including Horsemans Tents), when the Campaign comes to open." Three months later Weiss made reference to the condition of those tents in store. "...I find there seems to be much complaint about the second handed Tents (and washing) and am fearful they wont in genral be of above five or six Weeks duration, which if to be the case [we] shall be in a bad situation this Summer. — I would advise your exertion in that way to the utmost of your power that I may be able to supply the Troops." Unfortunately it seems that the care, condition and stock of tents did not improve during the year, leading to Washington's complaint to Congress in July 1780 that "We are so scantily supplied with Marquees and Tents, and have so little prospect of procuring a sufficient number by the common means."51

By summer 1781 the situation had been remedied to a degree. While Quartermaster General Timothy Pickering was able to write in August that, "The troops are now amply supplied with tents," only the previous month he had mentioned problems with newly allocated tents.

Since the army took the field I have heard great complaints of the smallness of the tents. The new common tents are not too big for four Men: upwards of 400 were made before my Appointment ... The same sail maker I suppose have made those sent only you, which tho of very good stuff yet are ruined by the smallness of their size. The new Marquees wall tents & common tents left on hand ... are generally made too of very ordinary linen & most of them ill contrived. I request you will immediately ... give directions to have no more tents made of such improper sizes: they occasion much injury to the service, as the poles of these small tents weigh as much as those of full size that will hold six men comfortably, even the common tents already made, which shall yet remain at Boston, I think had better be enlarged if of the small size complained of. In some Cases where these tents were of sufficient length they wanted brea[d]th. this defect might be remedied by adding a piece to each end to admit of the roofs spreading to a proper extent — Your tent makers must surely know the proper Dimensions of common tents at least & they are unpardonable to have made them as they have. if this saving has been advantage to them, they are criminal; if not, yet they have particularly injured the public. Some old common tents were from 7 to 7 1/2 feet square on the ground. The ends of the new tents Complained of are little more than five feet broad. It seems that the various descriptions of tents have been misunderstood.52

There were other considerations affecting the quantity of tents available, one being the previously noted occasional need of the army to divest itself of excess baggage to enhance mobility. For this reason, on at least three occasions the men assigned to a common tent was raised from the usual number of six. Four days before the Battle of Brandywine General George Washington commented on the army's situation. "Head Quarters Newport 7th Sepr 1777... The Genl has Received A Confirmation ... that the Enemy has Disencumber'd themselves of all their Baggage even tents Reserving only their Blankets, & Such part of their Clothing as is Absolutely Necessary, this Indicates A Speedy and Rapid movement, & points out the necessaty of following the example & Ridding ourselves for A few days of all things we possible can dispence with." Immediately after the battle the following order was issued, "Sepr 13th 1777 The following proportion of tents is Allowed the Army upon its next march Viz. 1 Soldiers tent for the Field officers 1 D[itt]o. for 4 other Commissioned officers 1 Do. for 8 Serjeants, Drummers or fifers 1 Do. for every 8 Privates. The Brigadiers to have Returns made out And the above proportion of tents taken for their Brigades." Since it would have been impossible for eight men to fit into a common tent many soldiers must have lacked shelter, including those on detached duty.53

FIG 10. Drawing and dimensions of a marquee and "Square Tent." On the left is shown the extension for the marquee; to the right is a representation and dimensions for the end of a square tent. Also included in this document are material lists and dimensions for horseman's, soldier's, and noncommissioned officer's tents. "Construction of Tents Dimensions & [height?] Jany. 1. 1781," Miscellaneous Numbered Records (The Manuscript File) in the War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records 1775-1790s, no. 31492 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M859, reel 111), U.S. War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records, Record Group 93, NA.

A similar reapportionment was enacted two years later during General John Sullivan's campaign against the Iroquois. Just prior to leaving Tioga, Pennsylvania, his troops were directed to disencumber themselves of all excess baggage. A follow-up order was issued on 23 August 1779: "The proportion of tents for this expedition is to be one tent for every eight men. The Brigadiers will see that no more tents be carried on for officers than are absolutely necessary." Again, it can be seen that not all the men assigned to a tent would have fit. Some discomfort must have resulted, as evidenced by one officer's 25 August journal entry: "The season of the year is advancing when we should begin to think of winter quarters as the men are poorly clothed and not above one in 12 have a blanket... nights here are already very cool." Earlier the same year, looking ahead to the campaigning season, the following admonition was appended to Washington's orders setting the tent allotment for his army: "No regiment is to have a greater proportion of tents either for officers or privates than the above; not even if the officers would furnish themselves at their own expence, as it will increase the baggage of the Army and render its operations more slow and tardy."54

FIG 11. Fly tents. This illustrates the form of the flys mentioned for hospital tents in 1782. Harold L. Peterson, The Book of the Continental Soldier (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1968), 154. Originally found in Francis Grose, Military Antiquities, Respecting a History of the British Army (London, 1801), 2: 11, 28-40.

In February 1781 a detachment of light troops was formed under the Marquis de Lafayette to operate in Virginia. Ensign Benjamin Gilbert of Massachusetts wrote that he "was ordered to march ... as on a Temporary Expedition, we weir ordered to take only our light Baggage." Camp equipage was also pared down and Lafayette was allotted "150 common & ten or twelve horseman's tents ... These, with those proposed to be sent from hence will be sufficient for the detachment, allowing seven men one common tent, and four captains &subalterns one horseman's tent. If there be three officers to a company six will have but one horseman's tent."55

As General Washington's army prepared for the 1781 campaign the condition of its tentage was brought to his attention. On 2 May Timothy Pickering sent a note to Washington's aide-de-camp, Tench Tilghman, "I inclose you a rough state of the tents on hand at the posts mentioned in the return... Mr. [Meig?] informed me some time since, that most of the tents issued last campaign were very old, & had they been preserved & carefully turned in, that not more than half of them would have been [fit for] use this campaign."56

Return of Tents for Washington's Army, May 1781

  Marquees Horseman's

At Fishkill Landing
fit for use
  6   3 31 406  
wanting repair   2 13   4 135 82
Fishkill  4 89   815  
Newburgh         12  
Morristown       100  
Rhode Island       147  
Boston (all new)   3     240  
Springfield (new) 20 17 33     8  
Total 35 124 68 1363   82

Pickering continued, "The 406 common tents at Fishkill Landing are all new. Those at Boston are what Colo. Hatch supposes the tent cloth he purchased will make, & which before this time might be finished. Of the tents turned in at Morristown by the Pennsylvania line only about 100 remain (as mentioned above) the rest (viz. about 140 common tents & perhaps 18 marquises) were delivered to the Marquis's detachment [Lafayette's troops were then in Virginia], besides 11 horseman's tents & 60 common tents sent from Newburgh ... Nearly all the tents mentioned in this return I expect will be fit for use this campaign, after the repairs are completed."57

Tents were sometimes subject to the demands of the moment. In May 1781 the Quartermaster General mentioned that, "Mr. Meig delivered the artillery to line their cloaths, 2 horseman's tents & 26 common tents. The artillery (as well as the other troops) retained many of their tents, some of which they applied to line their cloaths, besides those recd. from the store." The use of tentage for purposes other than shelter was not new. In 1779 Major General John Sullivan reduced the number of tents his force would carry as they advanced into New York. General orders for 22 August related that, "As a very great number of baggs will be wanted in order to carry flour for the army ... there is no other expedient way of procuring them than by cutting up tents and making them into baggs." In January 1781 Washington had ordered "All the Tents of the Army ... to be delivered to the Quarter Master General who will have them washed cleaned and repair'd. Such as are irreparable or as many of them as will answer the purpose he is to reserve to make cases for the Camp Kettles that they may not grease and injure the soldiers cloaths as they will next Campaign be obliged to carry their own Kettles." He reiterated this directive the next month, informing the quartermaster general "to have recourse to the expedient of converting the old tents unfit for use, into bags large enough to contain the kettles, that with proper belts or slings of the tent cloth itself or of leather as you should judge best, they might be carried at the mens backs."58

"The fewer the Waggons to the Army, the better..."
Transporting Tents

It was one thing to obtain a sufficiency of tents, quite another to provide for their carriage and ensure their presence when needed. Wagons were the usual mode of transport and when the tent proportions were readjusted in September 1777, Washington stipulated "one Waggon for every 50 tents & no more." Periodic reassessments were made of the load each wagon could carry. In January 1778 Jedediah Huntingdon calculated, "a Waggon of four Horses generally carries about forty Tents — each weighing about twelve pounds." A "Detail of Public Waggons, and those employd on hire for the Service of the Army" (29 March 1780) stipulated for "A Regiment of Infantry ... For Tents and Baggage allow a Waggon to 75 Men"; "A Brigade of 4 Regiments" would require twenty open wagons for that purpose. Each wagon would hold twelve common tents, which would suffice as shelter for seventy-five rank and file. This was later amended in July 1780 to one four-horse wagon "For the tents of a regiment, for every 75 men but this to be varied according to the weight of the tents and state of the roads."59

In 1781 Washington posed a question concerning "the allowance of waggons for carrying the tents of a regiment," and advised Timothy Pickering "to ascertain it by an experimental calculation; by computing the number of tents sufficient for a regiment; and by weighing one tent dry, another wet to estimate the average." The "Proposed distribution of waggons for the campaign 1781" suggested that "From twenty to thirty tents (according to their weight & the state of the roads) with their poles to be considered a load for a four ox team ... In the waggons allotted for the tents nothing is to be carried but tents and their poles."60

Some baggage problems were made clear by the 22 August 1781 orders to Major General Benjamin Lincoln's troops prior to their southward march toYorktown, Virginia. Washington stated that "the Detachment ... are to consider themselves as Light-troops who are always supposed to be fit for action and free from every incumbrance" and advised them to divest themselves of "every article of Baggage which they can in any wise dispence with." He went on to note the "great inconveniences [which] have arisen in the transportation of Baggage from officers commanding regiments procuring a greater number of waggons than is their proportion and from not having the Tents and Baggage of the officers conveyed in different Waggons from those that carry the Soldiers tents." To rectify these problems it was directed that each regimental field officer would be alloted "one covered waggon," "the regimental Staff Captains and Sub[altern]s: two covered and one open waggons," and "To every hundred men one open Waggon." Furthermore, "the commanding officers of regiments and corps to see that the tents and Baggage of the officers are convey'd in their proper Waggons and the Waggon Master General is directed to throw away any officers baggage that he finds loaded in those Waggons that are appropriated for the Soldiers Tents."61

Part of the question depended upon the wagon type used. Four-horse open wagons and two-horse open tumbrils (two-wheeled carts) were available, but the preferred vehicle was a “close” (covered) wagon pulled by four horses, or a covered two-horse tumbril. Covered wagons kept tentage dry and helped preserve it. At the beginning of their march south in February 1781, "three close waggons" were allotted Lafayette's light troops. These wagons were to hold "eleven horseman's & 60 common tents." Quartermaster General Pickering informed General Washington that an officer would also "impress ten two horse waggons & have them at King's ferry on the 20th to take up the baggage of the officers & the kettles of the men, as soon as they crossed [the Hudson River]. That number I judged sufficient, supposing the officers would take with them only their blankets, portmanteaus & cooking utensils." These wagons would also carry an additional 160 tents to be picked up at Morristown, New Jersey.62

In 1781 it was suggested that a single infantry regiment have three "4 horse close covered waggons," one "2 horse canvas covered [wagon] for Camp Kettles," and five "4 ox carts." Timothy Pickering in February 1782 described the carts he would like used. "It will doubtless be necessary to purchase many carts (with yokes & chains) ready made; others probably you will have to get made new, the latter I should wish to have larger then that were brought to the army last campaign, It would also be advantageous to make the sides as high as those of the Pennsylvania waggons, which will render them much more useful & convenient for the carrying of baggage, for which most of them are designed. The precise dimensions I cannot give, having no cart with which to make a comparison, But let them be as light as shall be consistent with a due degree of strength & the rough service in which they are sometimes employed."63

The "Pennsylvania waggons" mentioned by Pickering were probably the well-known Conestoga wagon. This type of wagon was used as long-distance carriers of supplies rather than for regimental baggage. Still, the quartermaster general recognized that they had certain features that would be useful on the army's baggage wagons. Though Pickering did not know offhand the dimensions of such vehicles, one example, said to have been built in 1762, had a bed four feet deep by fourteen feet long. The Conestoga wagon and its antecedents saw widespread use in Pennsylvania as early as 1730, and many of the wagons supplied to General Braddock's ill-fated 1755 expedition were of that type. In 1789 Dr. Benjamin Rush described the Conestoga as a "large strong wagon, covered with linen cloth ... In this waggon, drawn by four or five horses ... [farmers] convey to market over the roughest roads, two or three thousand pounds weight of... produce. In the months of September and October it is not uncommon to meet in one day from fifty to an hundred of these waggons on their way to Philadelphia, most of which belong to German farmers."64

Francis Rush Clark, "Inspector and Superintendent of His Majesty's Provision Train of Wagons and Horses," wrote extensively about British transport problems in 1776 and 1777. "Nothing, but absolute necessity, can justify the hiring [of] Carriage for the Army, which must always be incompleat, & attended with considerably more expence, than having it the property of the Crown... The English Waggons, sent over for the use of the Army, were undoubtedly much heavyer, than was either necessary or proper. It furnish'd a plausible excuse for not useing them ... [and] Orders were given, to hire Country Waggons in preference. Those, generally used in this province [New York], are the sort introduced by the first Dutch Settlers, & the same now made use of in Holland. Nothing of this sort could be constructed more unfit for an Army. They are so slight, as to be perpetually in want of repair. The Harness is made of slight leather & ropes, instead of Chains. These were taken promiscuously from the Farmers on Long & Island Staten Island, & some from the Jerseys. Many of them in a wretch'd Condition, & none having any Cover, to protect their Loading."65

FIG 12. "A Philadelphia Waggon" used by the British Army in Pennsylvania. British Commissary General Francis Clark wrote in November 1777, "I apprehend the English Waggons are preferable to those of Pennsylvania, which are large, unwieldy and without Covers to protect provision" and other stores. Wagons of this type also undoubtedly saw service with the Continental Army. "Narrative of Occurences, relative to His Majesty's Provision Train in North America" (circa 1778), and Francis Clark to Daniel Wier, Commissary General at Philadelphia, 10 November 1777, copies of letters relative to "Narrative," Francis Flush Clark Papers, Sol Feinstone Collection, The David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania. Drawing courtesy of The David Library of the American Revolution.

Clark executed drawings of several locally built wagons used by both sides during the war. In addition to a simple two-wheeled "Philadelphia Cart," he drew and described a "Philadelphia Waggon" (length 12 feet 3 inches; width, wheel to wheel — inside measurements — 6 feet 3 inches; height of sides, 10 inches), and the "Country Waggon from Long Island & New York" (length, 9 feet 10 inches; wagon body, front, 30 inches wide by 20 1/2 high; body rear, 41 inches wide by 34 inches high). Clark noted, "A great number of the Country Waggons, have straight Sides, but are put together in a most clumsy manner."66

The "large English" wagon supplied to the British army was about the same size as the Philadelphia wagon though probably better suited to carry large loads. These wagons may have been similar to the "Carrier's wagon" commonly used in Great Britain during the period of the American Revolution. Like Clark's "large English," carrier's wagons were noted to be of "great weight;" both were likely of the type known as a box wagon, with large wheels and able to carry heavy loads over rough road surfaces, though Superintendent Clark still deemed them unsuited for use in America.67

The Weight of the Waggons of the Army

The large English 13: 3:  
The Philadelphia 13: 3: 11
& 13: 2:  
    7. _. _.
The Dutch or American   7. 2. _.
    8. _. _.
    8. ___.
The English reduced   8. 2. _.
A new Waggon with Rope Sides &
Bottom, runs light & handy
  7. _. _

NB    This Waggon has been greatly approved by all that have seen it,
as the best & most fit for American Service.68

Francis Clark was intent on lessening the weight of wagons and enhancing their durability. One of his solutions was "The English reduced" wagon, a modification of the "large English." He was "Greatly distress'd at seeing the English Waggons & Stores, sent over at a considerable expence, remain unemployed ... With this view, I had several of the Waggons reconstructed, by which means I reduced the Weight from thirteen hundred & a half, to Eight hundred & a half, This made them very little heavyer than the Country Waggons, & in every respect better & more compleat, besides the advantage of Covers, to protect the bread & baggage & screen the sick & Wounded." A "new Waggon," designed by Clark, was proposed for adoption by the British army. "The Body of this Waggon is 10 Feet long, & 3 Feet 6 Inches wide, The Sides are 18 Inches high, & turn down with hinges; a Box before, a hind Board framed light, to take off at pleasure, The Hind Wheels 4 Feet 8 Inches high, & the Fore Wheels 3 Feet 8 Inches high.... This Waggon is made 4 Inches lower before than behind, which greatly facilitates the draught & light going, & the floor & Sides are made of Rope, spun of old Cordage, as few or no boards are to be purchased in these times; But if thought better, the floor & sides might be made with thin, light battins, flat hoops or twisted hay." Not one to wait complacently while the new wagon was being considered, the Superintendent had "One of the English Waggons ... alter'd & set up upon the same principle, & reduced in Weight from 1350 lb to 900 lb, & made up very serviceable, & with some still lighter."69

FIG 13. Bateaux of this size were called for by the Continental Army in 1781. Floor dimensions: 25 feet long by 5 1/2 feet wide; height of sides, 1 foot 10 inches. Described as having a "Sharp head & stem" and a carrying capacity of 40 men. "Dimensions of a [flat Bottomed Boat or] Batteaux" (December 1780), Numbered Record Books Concerning Military Operations and Service, Pay and Settlement of Accounts, and Supplies in the War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records, Record Group 93, National Archives Microfilm Publications M853, vol. 103, reel 29, 29.

All in all, the wagons used to carry regimental and army baggage began as a hodgepodge and probably remained so, ranging from sturdy, well-made vehicles, to "country waggons" and carts of varying quality. Given the needs of the armies, difficulties in procuring equipment, and diversity of campaign conditions, standardization of transport most likely was never achieved.

An alternative to wagons were pack or bat horses. One work defines a bat horse as one that "carried the baggage of an army officer. From French 'bat' [for] 'packsaddle.' In 1757 Washington wrote, 'the officers provided bat horses at their own expense.'" In the Continental Army that appellation was often used for officer's packhorses, but also described horses carrying other baggage. In a reconsideration of practices then current in the army, Brigadier General Jedediah Huntingdon in 1778 suggested, "The fewer the Waggons to the Army, the better, as the March of Troops is always greatly impeded, and Enterprizes often frustrated by their Delays — if Batt Horses could be substituted, they would be preferable — a Waggon of four Horses generally carries about forty Tents — each weighing about twelve pounds — the four Horses, therefore, carrying 10 or 12 Tents each, would transport as much as the Waggon."70

The first large-scale use of packhorses was by Major General John Sullivan's army in Pennsylvania and New York. Due to the rough country the army had to traverse, this mode of carriage was used from the first, and Sullivan mentioned the horses in several directives. Wyoming, Pennsylvania, 15 July 1779, "As waggons will not be wanted in this army, the Commander in chief directs that those which properly belong to the army be sent to the fort at Wyoming ... The horses now annexed to those waggons will be used either as riding or pack horses & the enlisted waggoners employed as pack horsemen." Wyoming, 27 July 1779, "Every article in every department that can possibly be loaded on Pack horses is to be fixed for that purpose and carried in that manner." "Hd.Qrs. Quilutimak 2d August" 1779 (en route to Tioga), "The baggage to be loaded on horseback to be fitted this evening in the best manner for loading. All the articles of baggage on board the boats which can be conveniently be carried on horseback will be taken out this day & fixed for that purpose."71

During the reorganization of Armand's Legion in February 1782, the unit's commander enumerated camp equipment and transport needed for thirty-three commissioned and staff officers, and 362 noncommissioned officers and privates. One marquee, ten horseman's tents, thirty common tents, eight bat horses, and three four-horse wagons were included. Colonel Armand noted, "The 30 common tents will be insufficient unless they are made very large.... Their weight, of consequence, will be less, [and] require, in the whole, fewer waggons, or bat-horses. Two thirds of the tent poles will also be sufficient. The bat-horses are destined for the carriage of the tents. For this purpose eight pack saddles will be requisite. There should also be eight oil cloths to cover the tents, to preserve them from rain, which, as they may be kept packed up for two or three days together in warm weather, would soon rot them, — and to prevent an increase in weight, which in long rains would be very injurious to the horses: for a tent thoroughly wet weighs just double as much as when dry."72

On rare occasions soldiers carried tent equipage. General orders, Washington's army, 2 September 1776, "When regiments march away in future, the officers are to see that the men take their tent-poles in their hands — All their Tin-Camp-Kettles, and see the Tents tied up very carefully, and a sufficient guard left to take care of them." On 17 October General Washington stated, “As the Movements of the Enemy make an Alteration of our position necessary, and some Regiments are to move towards them, the commanding and the other Officers of Regiments, are to see the following Orders punctually executed.--The Tents are to be struck, and carefully rolled, the men to take the Tent poles in their hands.” This was likely done because of transportation shortages, as evidenced by the remainder of the order: “two Men out of a Company with a careful Subaltern, to go with the Baggage, and not leave it on any pretence--No Packs (unless of Sick Men) Chairs, Tables, Benches or heavy lumber, to be put on the Waggons--No person, unless unable to walk, is to presume to get upon them--The Waggons to move forward before the Regiments, the QuarterMaster having first informed himself from the Brigadier, or Brigade Major, where they are to pitch …”73

British soldiers' tents were also carried in regimental wagons, again with infrequent exceptions. 40th Regiment orders, 20 May 1777, near Amboy, New Jersey: "The Regt: to Parade to morrow Morning at Half past Eigt: with Armes Accoutiments and Necessarys the last to be Properley Packd: & Slung in their Blanketts / the men to Carrey their tents and Other camp Equipage as the Waggons will be Employd: in Carriing straw." Evidently the troops were taking to their tents for the first time that year. A 12 May directive suggests this: “Head Qurters Amboy … 12th May 1777 ... All the British Regiments in Garrison to send Imeadatley for thier Camp Equipag to be in Red[y]ness to Take the Field on a Minutes Warning.” On May 20th the regiment removed from their winter lodgings, carrying the tents only a short. Another 20 May order related, “The Regiments to Encamp to morrow morning at 9 Oclock … the straw on Board the sloop to be taken up to the Ground to Morrow morning at 8 Oclock by the Wagns of the Regts: who are to Encamp ...”74

Wooden tent poles were also commonly carried in wagons, but a November 1776 order, and a series of summer 1777 orders, indicate that the men occasionally bore them. Forty-second Regiment, 13 November 1776, “The men [are] to Carry their Tent Poles and [are] not to put them on the waggons"; Fortieth Regiment, "Evening Regl: Orders 8 oClock 21st: June 77 The Tent poles & Camp Kettles to be carried by the men on the march" (that day the army marched from New Brunswick to “witht[in]. the lines at Amboy”). Prior to crossing to Staten Island from “the heights near Coals ferry" "A[fter] :R[egimental]:O[rders] 10 at nigt: [1 July 1777]” stipulated “The Tents to be struck & the Waggons loaded by 4 to morrow morning if the Wether is fare—The men to carry their tent poles & Camp Kettles." Once again, the march distance was short.75

Land transport was not the only option. Waterways could present an obstacle to a marching army or serve as a highway for moving troops and supplies. Throughout the war the Delaware River crossings at Coryell's Ferry and Trenton were important arteries for movement, but 1777 saw the height of their use by the army. Even before; the year's campaign opened, provisions were made to facilitate ferrying over large numbers of soldiers. On 30 May W. Masters informed the commander in chief that he had reached "Corrells wth: a Continental Fleet consisting of eight-flat bottom boats, fixed on Carrages; we expect a reinforsement of twelve by friday next all [of] w[hi]ch:... shall... be kept on the Carrages untill further Orders." Evidently the intention was to move as many vessels to Coryell's as possible, Masters asking whether carriages should be sent "to Philadelphia as the most expeditious method to get the whole Fleet to their destined Post; knowing the allmost imposability of procuring such Carrages in Philadelphia]." He went on to note that the flat-bottomed boats already at Coryell's "will carry thirty men each," and also that "We have at Trenton lower Ferry twenty boats built to transport 100 men each, & five artillary scows / five other scows will be ready at ower return built to carry two field peeses the Company [gunners and matrosses] & apparatus; the last mentioned boats & scows are large & [it] will be expensive pooling [i.e., pulling] them to Correls therefore request your ... orders ... should your Excellency think it necessary to have them up. Major Corell informs us the boats he has & what he can collect at a short notice will carry over 40 wagons p[er] Day." The size and construction of these vessels is not known, but dimensions for two large scows were given in an April 1781 return: one at West Point measured 50 feet long, 16 feet wide, with a "Depth" of 3 feet;" another scow at Fishkill Landing was 60 feet long by 13 feet wide. In February 1782 General Washington requested Timothy Pickering to "keep all the great Scows in constant repair, and as they are so convenient for transporting the Army on a sudden emergency, I should be glad to have the number augmented."76

River crossings had their hazards. On 30 July 1777, Captain John Chilton noted that his Virginia regiment "marched to Howels Ferry on Delaware [River] opposite Browns on the Pennsylvania side.... [July] 31st. about 11 [o'clock] ordered to cross the River, had the misfortune of having our Waggon overset in fording the River.... the Waggon and chief of the Tents were lost.... encamped about 2 Miles from R[ive]r. our Regt. were obliged to take [to] the woods for want [of] Tents." In 1781 the Pennsylvania regiments under General Anthony Wayne marched south to join the Marquis de Lafayette. Several officers described an incident during their 31 May crossing of the Potomac. Ensign Ebenezer Denny: "here we were detained for want of craft — boats few and in bad condition. The artillery passed over first.... The second flat-boat had left the shore about forty yards, when the whole sunk. Several women were on board; but as hundreds of men were on the bank, relief soon reached them; none were lost — got all over." Captain John Davis' account gives a few more details: "reach'd Powtomack [at Nowland's Ferry] ... which in crossing in Squows [another officer called them 'bad scows'], one unfortunately sunk loaded with (artilry, & Q[uarter] M[aster] Stores &) men, in which one Sergeant and three men were drowned."77

The "flat bottom boats" and "scows" on the Delaware and Hudson Rivers were intended primarily for crossing from one bank to the other; for long-distance travel up or down rivers, vessels called bateaux were commonly used. Bateaux, called by historian Russell Bellico "the workhorse of the military," are commonly associated with Benedict Arnold's march to Quebec in 1775, but they also saw extensive service with British and American forces in northern New York and Canada, as well as on the lower Hudson River. Probably of Dutch origin, these vessels had been used by the French in America since the 17th century, and were a primary mode of transport for both sides in the northern campaigns of the French and Indian War (1754-1763).78

Bateaux, usually propelled by oars, could be poled in shallow water, and were sometimes fitted with sails. Bellico notes that the "typical bateau on Lake George during [the mid-eighteenth century] ... was 25-35 feet long and held approximately 22 soldiers with provisions. The vessel was a flat-bottomed, double-ended boat with oak frames (ribs) and bottoms of pine planks ... One or two 'steersman' would control the direction of the bateau from the stern by use of a long sweep (oar)." Several bateaux sunk during 1758 in Lake George by the British army, and recovered in 1960, had "a 32 foot bottom length (34 feet overall)." In spring of 1776 Charles Carroll, part of a three-man Congressional Committee, described a bateau on which he passed Lake George as "36 feet long and 8 feet wide... and [able to] carry 30 or 40 men.... They are rowed ... [and] have a mast fixed in them to which square sail or a blanket is fastened." Large bateaux such as these could not be portaged over land, as was done by Arnold's soldiers in 1775, as easily as smaller versions.79Continental Army specifications for "a [flat Bottomed Boat or] Batteaux" (December 1780) called for these dimensions:

Length upon the floor 25  
Width upon the floor Midships   5   6
Width midships from Gunwhale to height Gunwhale   6   4
perpendicular height of the sides in board   1 10
Sharp head & stern    

This document also noted that "Such a boat will carry 40 men & has been found by Major Darby the best size to transport on carriages;" the bateaux used by Washington's troops in the move to Verplanks Point in 1782 were likely of this size (see below).80

After 1777, large-scale military activity ceased on the Canadian frontier, most troops moving southward. In autumn 1779 the Pennsylvania Division, then at West Point, was ordered to winter quarters near Morristown, New Jersey. The divisional baggage (including tents) was absent for part of the journey as noted by Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar: "November 20th: [1779] ... Struck our Tents at Gun firing — Baggage put on board Batteaus for New Windsor — The Division march'd about Ten O'Clock A.M. by the Forest of Dean, a very rough stony Road, and halted about half a Mile from Junes's Tavern; very disagreeable rainy Night and having no Tents, the Men suffered greatly."81

Three years later, in February 1782, Washington received a "Return of public Boats and Water Craft" listing "upwards of 200 Batteaux either fit for use or capable of being repaired." The commander in chief described these craft as the "species of Boats [which] will probably be the most essentially necessary." Their usefulness became apparent on 31 August 1782, when "the first considerable move... attempted by water was made" by a large portion of Washington's army down the Hudson, from West Point to Verplanks Point. The voyage was made in a fleet of bateaux, "with the utmost regularity and good order." Detailed instructions covering every aspect of the movement were issued, including disposition of baggage: General orders, 30 August, "Precisely at five o'clock tomorrow morning ... the tents and baggage of the two Connecticut and three Massachusetts Brigades are to be put into the batteaux... The boats of each regiment are to keep a breast and far enough a part to prevent interference; the Companies will embark as they are formed on the parade, and observe that order... No batteau is to be without a commissioned officer in it." The bateaux carried only soldiers and baggage, with artillery and excess baggage travelling by land to "join their respective corps at Verplanks point."82

We have looked at soldiers' living conditions, types of tentage used by the armies, shortages due to supply or the circumstances of active campaigning, and different modes of transport. As noted, tents were largely preferred for shelter, but from the ancient wars of Asia and Europe, through the American wars of the 18th and 19th centuries, down to the present day, soldiers could not always rely on the availability of tentage, and used houses, barns, churches, shelters built on the spot, or "Lay in the open world," as necessity dictated. The conditions under which makeshift shelters were built, their frequency of use, and construction, are examined in the next section of this study.


A number of people deserve recognition for their contributions to this study. Linnea Bass, Chuck Beale, Ted Filer, Stephen Gilbert, Justin Grabowski, Don N. Hagist, Charles LeCount, Donald Londahl-Smidt, Roy Najecki, John K. Robertson, and Will Tatum all supplied important information, images, or much-needed advice. André Gousse, Military Curator, Parks Canada, kindly gave me information on, and period illustrations of, 18th century French tents. James Kochan first made me aware of Timothy Pickering's 1781 letter concerning problems with tents and size specifications, and contributed other pertinent documents. Illustrations are always important but sometimes difficult to obtain. Ross Hamel has been a good and patient friend as well as a superb artist, and Marko Zlatich provided the 1781 sketches and specifications for several types of tents used by the Continental Army as well as additional primary material on the subject. Finally, Dr. David Fowler and the David Library of the American Revolution have again proven to be an invaluable resource, providing crucial support and encouragement for my research and writing. My thanks to all.

Go to Part III

Notes (continued)

38. "Diary of Lieutenant James McMichael, of the Pennsylvania Line, 1776-1778," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 16, no. 2 (1892):

39. Regimental orders, 19 May 1777, British Orderly Book (40th Regiment of Foot) 20 April 1777 to 28 August 1777, GW Papers, series 6B, vol. 1, reel 117.

40. "R:O 8th: June 1777 The Commanding Offrs: of Companays Are Desired: to turn out this Evening at Roll Call two of the properest men they have of A twelvemonths standing as Soldiers in the Regt for the Lt: Infantry That Capt: Wolfe may Chuse out the Numbr: he wants to Compleat his Compy: to 50 Rank And File," ibid.

41. Lender and Martin, Citizen Soldier, 87. Charles H. Lesser, The Sinews of Independence: Monthly Strength Reports of the Continental Army (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 54 (hereafter cited as Lesser, Sinews of Independence).

42. General orders, 24 May 1777, Order Book of Col. Daniel Morgan's llth Virginia Regiment, New Jersey, 15 May-9 June 1777, Early American Orderly Books, 1748-1817, Collections of The New-York Historical Society, microfilm edition (Woodbridge, NJ, 1977), reel 4, item 45.

43. Goodwin, Clothing and Accoutrements of the Virginia Forces, 1775-1780, 4-5; Joseph Brown Turner, ed., The Journal and Order Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood of the Delaware Regiment of the Continental Line (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1970), 146-147 (hereafter cited as Turner, Journal and Order Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood).

44. General orders, 27 May 1779, Fitzpatrick, WGW, vol. 15 (1936), 162-163.

45. "Estimate of Articles Necessary for 6000 Men for 12 Months March 2d. 1779", PCC, reel 192, 61, NA; Organization of an Infantry Regiment as of 27 May 1778 (1 light infantry company, 8 battalion companies.): Field Officers, 1 Colonel, 1 Lt. Colonel (or lacking a Colonel, a Lt. Colonel Commandant), 1 Major; Staff, 1 surgeon, 1 surgeon's mate, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 paymaster, 1 sergeant major, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 1 drum major, 1 fife major; Each Company, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 drummer, 1 fifer, 53 privates. Robert K. Wright, Jr., The Continental Army (Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1983), 127.

46. Timothy Pickering, "Estimate of Camp Equipage intended for a Regiment of Infantry", 31 January 1782, Numbered Record Books, NA, reel 29, vol. 103, 30.

47. Stewart Inspection Report, June 1782, Smith Collection, LWS 155, Morristown NHP.

48. George Washington to the President of Congress, l0 July 1775, Fitzpatrick, WGW, vol. 3 (1931), 323. General Orders, 20 September 1776, ibid., vol. 6 (1932), 78-79.

49. Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia 1763-1789 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958), 106-108; Charles Pinckney to William Moultrie, 24 May 1778, William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, (repr. New York: The New York Times & Arno Press, 1968), 1:212-214.

50. "Return of Men, Tents &c In the diferent Regt. in the Army June 1778," PCC, NA, reel 192, 267. In all, sixteen brigades were included, viz., Knox's Artillery, Woodford's, Scott's, Muhlenberg's and Weedon's Virginia Brigades, 1st, 2nd and "Late Conways" Pennsylvania Brigades, Poor's (New Hampshire and New York), Glover's, Learned's and Patterson's Massachusetts Brigades, Varnum's and Huntingdon's Connecticut Brigades, "Late Mclntosh" North Carolina Brigade, and 1st Maryland Brigade. Below are several sample brigades and regiments: (Unless other wise noted: all field officers have been allowed one common tent apiece; all commissioned and staff officers have been allowed one common tent for two men; and all noncommissioned officers have been allowed one common tent for four men.)

2nd Massachusetts Regiment (Learned's Brigade) had a ratio of ten men per tent.

14th Massachusetts Regiment (Patterson's Brigade) had a ratio of twenty men per tent.

German Regiment (1st Maryland Brigade) had a ratio of twenty-five men per tent.

Knox's Artillery Brigade (four regiments)
(1 marquee, 5 horseman's tents and 218 common tents total)

1 field officer 1 marquee
6 field officers 5 horseman's tents
139 commissioned and staff officers 35 common tents (four or five men per tent)
1,034 NCOs and rank and file 183 common tents (five or six men per tent)

1st Maryland Brigade (five regiments)
(5 marquees, 247 common tents total)

3 field officers 3 marquees
8 commissioned officers 2 marquees
90 commissioned and staff officers 23 common tents (four men per tent)
1,345 NCOs and rank and file 224 common tents (six or seven men per tent)

Woodford's Virginia Brigade (four regiments)
(2 marquees, 1 horseman's tent and 137 common tents total)

3 field officers 1 marquee and 1 horseman's tent
83 commissioned and staff officers 21 common tents (three or four men per tent)
1,019 NCOs and rank and file 116 common tents (eight or nine men per tent)

1st Pennsylvania Brigade (four regiments)
(2 marquees, 4 horseman's tents and 74 common tents total)

10 field officers 2 marquees and 4 horseman's tents
93 commissioned and staff officers 24 common tents (three or four men per tent)
840 NCOs and rank and file 50 common tents (eight men per tent )
(leaving 440 men without tentage)

2nd Pennsylvania Brigade (four regiments)
(2 marquees, 2 horseman's tents and 79 common tents total)

7 field officers 2 marquees and 2 horseman's tents
3 field officers 2 common tents
70 commissioned and staff officers 18 common tents (three or four men per tent)
938 NCOs and rank and file 61 common tents (eight men per tent)
(leaving 450 men without tentage)

51. James Abeel to Nathanael Greene, 9 November 1778, Robert E. McCarthy, ed., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, part 1: 1766-My 1780 (microfilm edition), from typescripts furnished by the Rhode Island Historical Society, reel 2, 455-456; Memorandum on additions to the new manual of instruction (de Steuben's Regulations), 10 March 1779, GW Papers, series 4, reel 56; Jacob Weiss to "Colo. Cox" (Assistant Quarter Master General), 23 February 1779, Weiss to James Abeel, 31 May 1779, Melville J. Boyer, ed., "The Letter Book of Jacob Weiss, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Revolution," Proceedings of the Lehigh County Historical Society, 21 (September 1956): 71, 79; George Washington to the President of Congress, 10 July 1780, Fitzpatrick, WGW, vol. 19 (1937), 150.

52. Timothy Pickering, memorandum to Col. Humphreys, August 1781, GW Papers, series 4, reel 80; Timothy Pickering to Jabez Hatch, 12 July 1781, Numbered Record Books, NA, vol. 127, reel 26, 252-253.

53. Turner, Journal and Order Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood, 165-166, 171.

54. Order Book of Lt. Col. Francis Barber, 26 May 1779 to 6 September 1779, Louise Welles Murray, ed., Notes from Craft Collection in Tioga Point Museum on the Sullivan Expedition of 1779 (Athens, PA, 1929), 77 (hereafter cited as Murray, Notes from Craft Collection in Tioga Point Museum); Journal of Major John Burrowes, Spencer's Additional Regiment, from Tioga, Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan, 42; General orders, 27 May 1779, Fitzpatrick, WGW, 15 (1936), 162-163.

55. Benjamin Gilbert to his father, 15 March 1781, from Annapolis, Maryland, John Shy, ed., Winding Down—The Revolutionary War Letters of Lieutenant Benjamin Gilbert of Massachusetts, 1780-1783 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 39-40; Timothy Pickering to George Washington, 18 February 1781, GW Papers, series 4, reel 75.

56. Timothy Pickering to Tench Tilghman, 2 May 1781, ibid., series 4, reel 77.

57. Timothy Pickering, "Rough state of the tents on hand ...," 2 May 1781, ibid., series 4, reel 77.

58. Timothy Pickering, "Rough state of the tents on hand ...," 2 May 1781, ibid., series 4, reel 77; After orders, 21 August 1779, Order Book of Lt. Col. Francis Barber, 26 May 1779 to 6 September 1779, Murray, Notes from Craft Collection in Tioga Point Museum, 72; General orders, 9 January 1781, Washington to Timothy Pickering, 10 February 1781, Fitzpatrick, WGW, 21 (1937), 73-74, 206.

59. Turner, Journal and Order Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood, 171; Observations on the Army, Jedediah Huntingdon to George Washington, 1 January 1778, GW Papers, series 4, reel 46; "Detail of Public Waggons, and those employd on hire for the Service of the Army ... reckoned for an Army of 30,000 Infantry — 5 regimts. Cavalry & 5 of Artillery," 29 March 1780, reel 41, target 161; "Plan For Conducting The Quartermaster General's Department, Agreed to in Congress, July 15th, 1780," (Philadelphia, 1780), 10, PCC, NA. Copy autographed by Moore Furman, Deputy Quartermaster General.

60. George Washington to Timothy Pickering, l0 February 1781, Fitzpatrick, WGW, vol. 21 (1937), 205-206; "Proposed distribution of waggons for the campaign 1781," Numbered Record Books, NA, vol. 103, reel 29, 1-3.

61. General orders, 22 August 1781, Fitzpatrick, WGW, 23 (1937), 37-38.

62. "Estimate of Waggons for a regiment of infantry under the new establishment of Octr. 1780," Timothy Pickering to George Washington, 14 January 1781, GW Papers, series 4, reel 74; Timothy Pickering to George Washington, 18 February 1781, ibid., series 4, reel 75.

63. "Proposed distribution of waggons for the campaign 1781," Numbered Record Books, NA, vol. 103, reel 29, 1-3; Timothy Pickering to Lt. Col. Dearborn, Col. Hatch and Ralph Pomeroy, Deputy Quarter Masters, 13 February 1782, ibid., reel 26, vol. 83, 85-86.

64. Pickering to Dearborn, Hatch and Pomeroy, 13February 1782, ibid., reel 26, vol. 83, 85-86; George Shumway, Edward Durell, and Howard C. Frey, Conestoga Wagon 1750—1850 (York, PA: George Shumway, 1964), 14-21, 35-37; John Omwake, The Conestoga Six-Horse Bell Teams of Eastern Pennsylvania (Cincinnati: Ebbert & Richardson, 1930), 32-33.

65. "Narrative of Occurences, relative to His Majesty's Provision Train in North America" (circa 1778), Francis Rush Clark Papers, Sol Feinstone Collection, The David Library Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pa. (hereafter cited as "Narrative of Occurences," Clark Papers, Feinstone Collection).

66. Colored drawings and descriptions of wagons in "Narrative of Occurences," Clark Papers, Feinstone Collection.

67. J. Geraint Jenkins, The English Farm Wagon (Wiltshire, U.K.: David & Charles, 1972), 9-13.

68. Colored drawings and descriptions of wagons in "Narrative of Occurences, Clark Papers, Feinstone Collection.

69. Ibid.

70. Richard M. Lederer, Jr., Colonial American English: A Glossary, (Essex, CT: Verbatim, 1985); "Detail of Public Waggons, and those employd on hire for the Service of the Army ... reckoned for an Army of 30,000 Infantry — 5 regimts. Cavalry & 5 of Artillery," 29 March 1780, reel 41, target 161. In total 14 covered wagons, 26 open wagons and 218 horses (including 7 bat horses for field officers and regimental staff) were deemed necessary for a brigade of infantry in 1780. Observations on the Army, Jedediah Huntingdon to George Washington, 1 January 1778, GW Papers, series 4, reel 46.

71. Order Book of Lt. Col. Francis Barber, 26 May 1779 to 6 September 1779, Murray, Notes from Craft Collection in Tioga Point Museum, 34-35, 47, 56-58.

72. "Establishment of the legion commanded by Coll. Armand Marquis de la Rouerie," 13 February 1782,Numbered Record Books, NA, reel29, 35-37.

73. General orders, 2 September 1776, Fitzpatrick, WGW, vol. 6, (1932), 7-8; General orders, 17 October 1776, ibid., vol. 6 (1932), .

74. Regimental orders, 20 May, General orders, 12 May 1777, After general orders, 20 May 1777, British Orderly Book (40th Regiment of Foot) 20 April 1777 to 28 August 1777, GW Papers, series 6B, vol. 1, reel 117. For the unit allotment of baggage wagons: "Head Qrs: N: York 2nd: June 77 Orders- 5 Waggons will be Allowed to each Battn: And 10 Waggons for each Corps of Gredrs: & Lt: Infantry British, no more can possabley be Allowd: for the Baggage"; "At Nigt 25th: June 77 Two Waggons to be Allowed on the march to each Regt: of Dragoons & Two to each Battn: of Infantry wh: four horses to Each — One Waggon to Carry the Offrs: Provision & two days Rum for the Men the Other to be A spare Waggon & Kept Empty," General orders, 2 and 25 June 1777, ibid.

75. 17th Regiment of Foot Orderly Book, 11 October to 28 December 1776, New-York Historical Society Collections (microfilm edition, reel 4, no. 41). Regimental orders, 21 June, 1 July 1777 British Orderly Book (40th Regiment of Foot) 20 April 1777 to 28 August 1777, GW Papers, series 6B, vol. 1, reel 117.

76. W. Masters to George Washington, 30 May 1777, ibid., series 4, reel 42; "Return of all Public Craft and Boats on Hudson's and the Mohawk River," 2 April 1781, ibid., series 4, reel 76; Washington to Timothy Pickering, 21 February 1782, Fitzpatrick, WGW, 24 (1938), 15-16.

77. 30 and 31 July 1777 entries, John Chilton's Diary, VHS. "Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny," Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 3, (1860): 238. "Journal of Captain John Davis of the Pennsylvania Line," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 5 (1881): 291. "Journal of Lieut. William McDowell of the First Penn'a Regiment, in the Southern Campaign, 1781-1782," John Blair Linn and William H. Egle, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution, Battalion and Line 1775-1783, (Harrisburg, 1880), 2:297. "Diary of the Pennsylvania Line, May 26 1781-April 25, 1782, ibid., 677. The foregoing "Diary" includes the journals of both Captain Joseph Mcclellan and Lieutenant William Feltman.

78. Russell P. Bellico, Sails and Steam in the Mountains: A Maritime and Military History of Lake George and Lake Champlain (Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 1995), 14, 25-26, 62, 64, 73, 91-92, 101, 121 (hereafter cited as Bellico, Sails and Steam in the Mountains); "Arnold Leads an Expedition to Quebec," Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, eds., The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants (New York, 1975), 192— 201; William L. Stone, ed. and trans., Journal of Captain Pausch, Chief of the Hanau Artillery During the Burgoyne Campaign (Albany, 1886), 76-88, 91-92.

79. Bellico, Sails and Steam in the Mountains, 79-84, 131-132.

80. "Dimensions of a [flat Bottomed Boat or] Batteaux," circa 1782, Numbered Record Books, NA, vol. 103, reel 29, 29.

81. "Lieut. Colonel Josiah Harmar's Journal. No: 1. Commencing November llth: 1778.", 11 November 1778 to 2 September 1780, 74, Josiah Harmar Papers, William C. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

82. Washington to Timothy Pickering, 21 February 1782, Fitzpatrick, WGW, 24 (1938), 12-13; General orders, 30 and 31 August 1782, ibid., 25 (1938), 93-97.